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categories used by Jacobs, extend the analysis to 2002, and broaden the range of questions considered.
To foreshadow our analysis, we find that the gender segregation of baccalaureate degree recipients has declined, but much faster in the first than in the second half of the period considered (1971 to 2002) . We consider how trends in segregation relate to trends in women's increased representation among those receiving degrees, finding that increasing representation of women relative to men getting college degrees is associated with desegregation, although the former has changed much more than the latter. We also examine trends for selected large fields, showing that desegregation did not come from men entering traditionally female fields. Rather desegregation came from increasing proportions of successive cohorts of women entering traditionally male fields, and desegregation stalled when new cohorts of women did not continue the trend. Fixed-effects regression analyses show another drag on the desegregation trend; women's increase in a field discourages later cohorts of men from choosing it.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON GENDER CHANGE IN EDUCATION
As important as the question is, this article will not explain why some fields have consistently graduated more women than men-for example, why more math-intensive fields graduate more men whereas fields involving more use of language and study of humans graduate more women. 1 Rather, our focus is on change in the gender composition of fields and of baccalaureate degree recipients at large. Our data are limited to the number of men and women graduating with a major in each detailed field from 1971 to 2002. Fortunately, computations we can make from these limited data allow us to answer previously unanswered questions posed by two theoretical perspectives on gender-related change in education, described below.
Devaluation of the feminine. In making predictions about change, we draw heavily on the devaluation perspective. The central idea is that our culture devalues women, and this leads to devaluation or stigmatization of all things associated with women-styles of clothing, names, leisure activities, fields of study, or jobs.
2 This perspective was developed to explain the relatively low pay of occupations filled largely by women. A large body of research shows that jobs filled largely by women are paid less than jobs filled by men, even when the jobs under comparison require the same amount (though different types) of education and skill (England 1992; Sorensen 1994; Steinberg 2001) . 3 The devaluation perspective implies an asymmetry in gender-related change. The stigma of a nontraditional choice is stronger for men than women, because when men make a nontraditional choice, they are entering the devalued sphere of things associated with women (Williams 1989 (Williams , 1993 (Williams , 1995 . When women make a nontraditional choice, they are entering a sphere the culture values more. This has two implications for change. First, integration of fields is more likely to come from women entering predominantly male fields than from men entering predominantly female fields. This is because men have little incentive to enter fields of study or work whose status and pay have been lowered by their association with women. By contrast, although many forces of socialization and discrimination push women in a traditional direction, women nonetheless have some incentive to make nontraditional moves, given the pay and status associated with men's fields. Consistent with this reasoning, change in the gender system has involved more women's movement into men's previous strongholds than men's movement into women's traditional pursuits. This is true of occupations, leisure activities, and modes of dress. Jacobs (1995, 91-92) finds this for changes in men's and women's fields of college study in the 1970s and 1980s; integration came mostly from women increasingly choosing fields traditional for men, not from more men entering predominantly female fields. We will examine whether it is true for fields of bachelor's degrees for a longer period (1971 to 2002) .
A second implication of the devaluation perspective for change is that if women enter some formerly male-dominated or integrated fields in large numbers, these fields will become less attractive to men precisely because they will be increasingly seen as a woman's major. In the extreme, they may "tip" to all women. We will test this using regression to assess whether the gender composition of a field at one point in time discourages the men graduating a few years later from getting a degree in that field.
Does gender integration of college students bring field integration?
A second theoretical perspective on gender-related change in education and occupations is proposed by Charles and Bradley (Bradley 2000; Bradley and Charles 2004; Charles and Bradley 2002) . They distinguish between gender-integrative change along two dimensions-vertical and horizontal. The vertical dimension refers to the level of degree one gets-grade school, high school, baccalaureate, or graduate degree. The horizontal dimension is field of study. 4 They show that in many countries, as women have increased their representation among those getting college degrees, the segregation of fields of study has decreased little if at all (Bradley 2000) . Their crossnational analyses show little correlation between how well women are represented among those getting college degrees and how segregated they are in fields of study (Bradley and Charles 2004; Charles and Bradley 2002) . Why don't the two forms of universalism-women catching up to men in getting college degrees and desegregation of fields of study-go together? They argue that opening higher education to women flows from diffusion of two beliefs-that education of a higher proportion of citizens is good for economic growth and that men and women should have equal opportunity to any given level of education. At the same time, they argue, cultural ideas featuring gender essentialism-beliefs that men and women are interested in and suitable for different kinds of study and work-remain strong in modernity. The result is more favorable for gender integration by level than field of study.
Charles's and Bradley's main analyses examine the correlation between these two types of gender change across nations. Our analysis will hold nation constant (the United States) and use variation over time to see if women's representation among baccalaureate recipients correlates with field segregation. Charles and Bradley assert a 0 or positive correlation. A competing hypothesis to theirs is that all reductions of gender ascription tend to move together, perhaps because they are affected by common social conditions (e.g., a women's movement, egalitarian cultural change), and thus that women's representation among baccalaureate degrees and field segregation are negatively related. Finally, an alternative view suggests a positive relationship. If increasing representation of women (relative to men) getting baccalaureate degrees means that the women getting degrees are less selective academically (relative to men), and if more select women are more apt to choose predominantly male majors, then segregation would actually increase as women's representation increases.
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Our analyses. The devaluation perspective suggests hypotheses with a different unit of analysis than do the theories dealing with how women's increasing representation among those getting college degrees relates to field desegregation. Hypotheses at the two levels are not mutually exclusive. From Charles's and Bradley's theory and competing views, we test whether across years, women's representation among baccalaureate recipients is positively, negatively, or not correlated with the level of segregation. If most forms of ascription by gender change together, we expect a negative relationship; if increases in women's representation decrease the selectivity of women students and men's majors are more select, we expect a positive relationship; and Charles's and Bradley's theory suggests a zero or positive relationship.
From the devaluation perspective, we test the predictions that any desegregation that has occurred comes more from women's than men's nontraditional moves and that as women increase their representation in fields, this discourages men from entering them.
DATA AND METHOD
Data. We use data published annually by the National Center for Education Statistics (1973 Statistics ( -2003 on the number of women and men receiving bachelor's degrees in all fields of study from academic year 1970-1971 to 2001-2002 . The system used by the National Center for Education Statistics to classify degrees into fields of study changed several times during the period. The most significant classification changes occurred in 1983 when the number of categories greatly increased. Some changes were simply minor changes in field names; in these cases, we simply adopted the later name. When more detailed categories appeared, the new fields were often collapsed into the appropriate broader category used previously. In other cases, the new fields were put into the other category for the relevant broader field. The other category, which appears for all of the broadly defined fields, is what changes most over time, as more fields that cannot be classified elsewhere were added to that category. However, such fields constitute a tiny portion of degrees. From these classifications, we constructed a categorization system of 263 fields for the 32-year period.
6 Some of the 263 fields in our detailed classification are very small, and this can lead to inaccuracies in measuring segregation. To deal with this, we dropped fields that produced fewer than 1,000 bachelor's degrees during the 23 years examined. We also dropped the few fields that have missing values on the number of women degree recipients in any of the 23 years, so fields that disappeared or did not exist in 1971 were excluded. These two types of exclusions led to dropping 38 fields, leaving 225 fields in our data set for analysis. The dropped fields compose less than 2 percent of all degree recipients, so dropped data should not distort things much. We created a data set with field/year as the unit of analysis for all academic years beginning with 1970-1971 and through 2001-2002. 7 (We will refer to academic years in terms of the later year.) Some of our analyses are based on descriptive statistics for selected large fields. To select fields, we first chose those 14 largest fields that, taken together, account for half of all degrees given across the period. To these we have added four technical fields in the natural sciences and engineering that, while not among the 14 largest fields, are reasonably large and have been a focus of concern about gender integration. Together, these 18 fields account for 59 percent of all degrees given. We will consider trends in three ratios for selected individual fields: (1) proportion of degree recipients in this field who are women (the number of women in the field divided by total number of men and women in the field), (2) proportion that women degree recipients in this field were of all women getting any baccalaureate degree (the number of women in the field divided by the number of women in all baccalaureate fields combined), and (3) proportion that men degree recipients in this field were of men getting any baccalaureate degree (the number of men in the field divided by the number of men in all baccalaureate fields combined). Each of these ratios is specific to a particular year.
Measures of segregation.
We examine the trends in gender segregation of fields. The most common measure used in studying gender segregation is D, the index of dissimilarity (Duncan and Duncan 1955) . The interpretation of D is often explained in a shorthand way as the percentage of women (men) who would have to "trade" fields with a man (woman) for both women and men to be represented in all fields in proportion to their representation in the overall system. This shorthand describes the numerator of D. A more precise way to understand the index is that the numerator is the number of trades of women and men required for evenness as described above, and the denominator is the maximum number of such integrative trades possible starting from complete segregation. The denominator is maximized when each group is 50 percent of the population. D is implicitly weighted; big fields contribute more. This is appropriate if our interest is in the segregation experienced by the average person in the system. However, this self-weighting of D also means that trends over time can be driven by disproportionate growth in more or less segregated fields, even in the absence of changes in the composition of any field. It can thus be useful to examine trends in D together with its sized-standardized variant, SSD. SSD has the same interpretation but is calculated so as to treat all fields as if they were the same size. More recently, Grusky and Charles (1998) have devised A, an index of association based on log-linear models. Unlike SSD, but like D, A is invariant to changes in the proportion of men and women in the overall baccalaureate population. It is also invariant to changes in the relative sizes of fields; like SSD, it achieves this by weighting all fields equally. Our goal here is not to debate the relative merits of these indices but to see if there is a robust conclusion about trends.
Trend and correlational analyses. For some analyses, we use years as the units of analyis. In the simplest of these, we simply look at trends in women's proportion of all degrees and in measures of segregation. To test Charles's and Bradley's hypothesis and its competitors, we compute correlations (Pearson's r) between segregation measures and women's representation with the 32 years as units of analysis.
Regression models. We test the hypothesis that men create a drag on desegregation by increasingly avoiding fields as the proportion of women in the field rises. To do this, we use a fixed-effects regression model (Allison and Waterman 2002; Cameron and Trivedi 1998) . The unit of analysis is the field/year. The independent variable is the lagged proportion of those getting bachelor's degrees in the field who are women; the dependent variable is the (natural log of the) number of men getting bachelor's degrees in the field four years later. (We have experimented with the lag and get similar results.) The idea is that men form their idea of the gender label of a field from observing the gender composition of the majors a few years ahead of them and that they are less likely to choose a major if it looks "too" filled by women. The fixedeffects model is used to control for all stable characteristics of each field. For example, if some fields are always larger than others because they are attractive to students, this is controlled. Similarly, if a field has an unmeasured characteristic, such as being math intensive, which might attract more men than women, and this has a relatively constant effect on its gender composition, this is also controlled. If a field has an enduring social label as a man's or woman's domain and this affects which gender has more social support for choosing the field as a career, this is controlled. Fixed-effects models remove more omitted-variable bias than other available options. The models we estimate also include an "offset" term to control for the total number of bachelor's degrees awarded to men in any given year whose coefficient is constrained to be 1.0. All regression models contain dummies for fields and years.
From our data, discussed above, on 225 fields, we created a data set with field/year as unit to enable estimation of the regression models. This contained 7,200 observations (32 years times 225 fields). In the models, we lag the women's proportion of those in the field four years behind the dependent variable. Thus, although our data start in 1971, we need to use the first four years simply to get the lagged independent variable scores, so the regressions predict the number of men in fields from 1975 to 2002. So there are 6,300 observations in our regression analysis (28 years times 225 fields, after we lose four years to the lagging process). The regression analysis also dropped 9 field/year observations because they had 0 persons in them for a given year, so that the proportion who are women cannot be computed (as ratios with denominator 0 are undefined). This left 6,291 (field/year) cases for our models. Figure 1 shows trends in segregation of fields, using the three indices (note that A is on a different scale). All three decline, but much more in the early half of the period. Table 1 shows these trends in segregation in another form; for each period of approximately a decade, an annual average percentage change is shown. (The fact that the three periods do not have exactly the same number of years does not distort the comparisons since rates of increase are annualized and averaged.)
TRENDS IN SEGREGATION AND WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION AMONG COLLEGE GRADUATES
Women received 44 percent of all bachelor's degrees in 1971, 49 percent in 1980, 53 percent in 1990, and 58 percent in 2002 (authors' calculations). Table 1 converts these figures on women's proportion of all degree recipients into annual average percentage change. It shows that women's relative representation increased the most in the 1970s (averaging 1.4 percent increase per year), less in the 1980s (averaging 1.1 percent a year), and the least in the 1990s (averaging 0.8 of 1 percent increase per year). Overall, Table 1 shows that when women's representation among all baccalaureate recipients was increasing the most, segregation was going down the most, by any of the measures. As a check on this conclusion, we made the 32 years the units of analysis and computed a correlation (Pearson's r) between level of segregation in the year and women's proportion of all baccalaureate degrees. We did this separately for each of the three indices of segregation. The correlations are large, significant, and negative (-.84 for D, -.88 for SSD, and -.79 for A). The negative sign tells us that the higher the proportion women constituted of all baccalaureate recipients, the lower segregation was. This is contrary to the prediction from Charles's and Bradley's theory. They argue that women's integration into college degrees typically does not bring desegregation of fields. But in our data, segregation has gone down as women's overall representation has gone up, and decades where segregation decreases more are the earlier ones in which women's representation among all bachelor's degree recipients was going up the most. It appears that the two types of gender ascription declined together, and their decline stalled together in the period we are studying. However, it is also true that women have achieved and exceeded equality in representation in baccalaureate degrees, but segregation is still substantial; in this, our findings are in the spirit of Charles's and Bradley's point that increasing women's representation in college by no means ensures desegregation.
8 Our findings are also contrary to the hypothesis that better representation of women in college comes at the expense of women's selectivity; if that were true, then as women were better represented in degrees, segregation would go up, but we do not see this.
TRENDS IN SELECTED FIELDS: DID DESEGREGATION COME FROM MEN'S OR WOMEN'S MOVES TOWARD NONTRADITIONAL CHOICES?
We next examine selected large fields individually to ascertain what kinds of shifts were driving the early desegregation and the later stalling of desegregation. Figure 2 )-business-related fields, fields traditional for women, and the natural science and engineering fields. For each field, the ratio showing trends in how popular the field was (compared to other fields) among women is the number of women in this field divided by the number of women in all fields. It shows the probability that in the given year, a woman chose this major, conditional on getting a bachelor's degree. Analogous ratios in each graph show how popular the field was among men. (By contrast, the ratios in Figure 2 , giving the proportion women constitute of all those in each field, have total number of men plus women in the field as the denominator.) Consider first the business-related majors in Figure 3 . Business, marketing, and accounting all started disproportionately male in 1971 and, during the first half of the period, became dramatically more attractive to women (relative to other majors and relative to their popularity with men). Then in the latter half of the period, men's and women's trend lines move together in parallel, with women's either right on the men's curve (accounting) or a small but fairly constant amount below it, as popularity of the field fluctuates up or down for both women and men simultaneously. The desegregation of the early period came in part from women's disproportionately entering these predominantly male fields, but this flattened out about halfway through the period. By contrast, economics (not shown) showed approximately parallel lines for men and women without the convergence in patterns seen in the business fields.
Trends in the natural sciences are different than in the business-related fields, even though both groups of fields start the period disproportionately filled with men. Figure 4 shows physics, chemistry, and engineering. In the first half of the period, successive cohorts of men moved away from physics and chemistry. 9 The other natural sciences, the largest of which is biology, also showed a sharp decline in the proportion of men selecting it until almost 1990, but it followed an increase in the first half of the 1970s (not shown). Did this movement of men away from these male-dominated science fields reduce segregation? It would have unless the new cohorts of men chose fields even more numerically dominated by men instead. There is some evidence that this happened, as Figure 4 also shows that the proportion of men going into electrical or electronic engineering went up from 1977 for a decade. If we take all engineering fields together, the pattern looks similar (not shown). Computer science (not shown) also showed a dramatic increase in the proportion of all men choosing it as a major, starting even earlier, from 1971 to 1985. Thus, it may be that successive cohorts of those men oriented to technical fields moved away from pure sciences toward the more lucrative and applied fields of engineering and computer science. The popularity of these technical fields for women remained fairly flat or slightly increased.
What happened in the fields traditional for women, such as elementary education, English, and sociology? As Figure 5 shows, these fields lost 10 Since then, the lines are flat and parallel for women and men. The fact that successive cohorts of women moved away from these fields much more rapidly than men contributed to desegregation. The one mostly female field that women did not vacate was nursing; perhaps because of increased demand for nurses, the proportion of women's degrees going to this field did not sag (not shown). Men did not contribute to desegregation by going into these (or other predominantly female) fields in greater numbers than previously.
Psychology and communication (not shown) started off with gender compositions about average for all fields. They both showed dramatic increases in the proportion of all women choosing the majors, while men's election of these fields declined (psychology) or increased less rapidly (communication). Thus, both became increasingly feminized over time, and their tipping may have contributed to the stall in segregation. Overall, our examination of specific fields supports the idea that the desegregation that occurred came from successive cohorts of women majoring in fields nontraditional for their gender; little of it came from men moving in a nontraditional direction toward fields traditional for women. This asymmetry of gender-related change is what the devaluation perspective predicts, because women gain status and pay by choosing predominantly male fields but men lose by choosing predominantly female fields.
DOES FEMINIZATION DISCOURAGE MEN FROM CHOOSING A FIELD?
Our regression analyses are designed to see if men avoid fields in response to their feminization. Table 2 presents the results of our fixed-effects regression analyses. Using a dependent variable of (the natural logarithm of the) number of men majoring in the field, we assess the effect of the proportion of those in the fields who were women four years previously. We also test for nonlinearity by including its square in some models. The basic idea we are testing is that as the majors that men can observe in a field get to contain a higher proportion of women, men are more deterred from selecting the fields. The devaluation thesis hypothesizes that, consciously or unconsciously, men find it stigmatizing to be associated with women. Since descriptive analyses above show different trends by period, to see if the effects changed over time, we present results for the whole period, for the first half (1975 to 1988) , and for the second half of the period (1989 to 2002) . When 1975 to 2002 is taken as a whole, increasing the percentage of women in a field discourages men's entrance linearly. The linear shape can be seen by the nonsignificance of the squared term. This directs us back to the model without the squared term, and it shows a negative effect of the lagged proportion of women in fields on the (later) number of men graduating in the majors. When we do a separate analysis for the two half periods, we see that in the 1975 to 1988 period, an increasing percentage of women in fields encouraged men's entrance up to 54 percent but discouraged it at any higher levels. (We use the nonlinear model since the squared term is significant; its inflection point where the curve turns from positive to negative is at .54.) In the 1989 to 2002 period, increasing percentage of women discourages men's entrance linearly (the squared term is not significant, and the model without it shows a significant negative effect of percentage of women). Broadly speaking, the regressions in Table 2 show that a high proportion of women majoring in a field deters men coming a few years behind them from choosing that major. This is predicted by the NOTE: Each row is one regression model. Models vary in which years they cover. All models include dummy variables for fields and years. The dependent variable is always the natural logarithm of the number of men getting a bachelor's degree in the field in the year. Independent variables are lagged four years behind dependent variables. Bolded coefficients show preferred models; models including squared terms only preferred when the terms have significant effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. *significant at .05 level (two-tailed). **significant at .01 level (two-tailed).
devaluation thesis, which asserts that men find it stigmatizing to choose fields if they get too identified with women. It is also consistent with the findings of England et al. (2004) for fields of doctoral study; they found that feminization of fields discouraged men from entering.
11
How do we interpret the changing shape of the effect of feminization on men's choosing fields over time? It started out nonlinear (deterring men's entrance only when women got greater than 54 percent in the first half of the period) but deterred men's entrance across the whole range of proportion of woman in the second half (see Table 2 ). Since the student population as a whole was feminizing the whole time, by the second half of the period, many fields had shifted far enough up to be in the range where the effect operates. The findings suggest that in the latter period, successive cohorts of men were moving away from formerly predominantly male but feminizing fields into fields that had not feminized as much. This would have contributed to the stalling of desegregation observed in Figure 1 .
CONCLUSION
Baccalaureate degree recipients have gone from 44 to 58 percent women from 1971 to 2002. Women's representation increased most rapidly in the first decade. Indeed, although the fact that women are getting more college degrees than men has just recently surfaced in the popular press, women's numbers passed men's in 1982 and have remained higher ever since. During these three decades, the gender segregation of fields of undergraduate study has declined, but the largest decline was in the first half of the period. During that period, successive cohorts of women changed their field choices quite dramatically toward fields dominated by men-out of fields dominated by women such as education and English and especially into business-related fields. Virtually none of the desegregation came from more men choosing fields traditional for women in significantly greater numbers. In the latter half of the period, women's probabilities of choosing the historically male-dominated majors failed to continue their upward trek, and their probabilities of choosing fields traditional for women (such as English and elementary education), which had been falling, stopped their fall. This is a large part of why desegregation has stalled. Desegregation was also stalled by the fact that, as fields feminized, men eschewed the fields, especially in the more recent period, as our regression results show. Whether this still-somewhat-segregated equilibrium is temporary or will hold for the long term remains to be seen.
Our interpretation of these patterns draws on two theoretical perspectives with implications for change. The devaluation perspective helps us to understand why gender-related change is deeply asymmetric. While desegregation could come from women's abandoning predominantly female for predominantly male fields or from men's abandoning predominantly male for predominantly female fields, almost all the change was of the former type. We believe that this is because any field associated with women has been culturally devalued, so that women have more to gain than men in status and rewards from majoring in fields nontraditional for their gender. Devaluation also explains our regression-based findings that feminization of fields deters men from entering.
Our hypotheses about the timing of change were guided by Charles's and Bradley's theorizing about the separateness of change in women's representation in the overall population of college graduates and field segregation. They argued, based on cross-national work, that there is little link between the two types of equalization because ideologies of modernity encourage increased enrollment and equal opportunity for the same level of education, without undercutting essentialist beliefs that fields are more appropriate for one gender than the other. We do not dispute their cross-national generalization or their claim that there is nothing in modernity that automatically gets rid of all forms of ascription. However, we note that at least in the United States for this period, both types of gender inequality tended to change simultaneously, as if affected by a common set of causes. This is not what at least a strong version of their perspective would predict. We agree with them, however, on the claim that egalitarian change increasing women's representation in higher education has proceeded much further than field desegregation.
The factors contributing to the surge and then stall of both of these forms of gender change are many and are complex, and our data are limited in what they tell us about this process. We know that unlike entry to jobs, where women may face employer discrimination, students are generally allowed into any major they declare once admitted to a college or university.
12 So majors may reflect socially constructed interests or aspirations for occupations (Xie and Schauman 2003) . But they may also reflect anticipation of discrimination by employers, or how comfortable students feel with faculty or peers in classes. Which of these factors changed most rapidly in the 1970s and then stalled is not clear from our data. However, our findings for the undergraduate realm are consistent with broader trends in U.S. gender inequality. As Cotter, Hermsen, and Vanneman (2004) show, progress toward gender equality in the pay gap, occupational segregation, and egalitarian attitudes all stalled in the 1990s. Many forms of gender inequality seem to have moved and then stalled together. Understanding the social roots of this stall is an important topic for further feminist research.
NOTES
1. Research has focused on two major explanations of segregation of fields: math skills or preparation and aspirations. In high school, boys score slightly above girls on math tests on average, with a larger gender difference at extremely high scores because of the mean difference combined with boys' higher variance (Friedman 1989; Linn and Hyde 1989) . Boys used to take more high school math courses than girls, but by 1993, this had converged; girls still took physics less (Xie and Shauman 2003, 241) . But even back in the 1980s, the score and course differences explained little of the gender difference in majoring in science or engineering in college (Xie and Shauman 2003) . High school students' aspirations for occupations and college majors are quite gender typed (Lueptow, Garovich-Szabo, and Leuptow 2001; Marini and Brinton 1984; Marini and Greenberger 1978; Wilson and Boldizar 1990) , and gender differences in high school aspirations for college major explain a good share of differences in majoring in and getting a degree in a natural science or engineering field (Xie and Shauman 2003) . Jacobs (1995) shows that the large gender differences in majoring in engineering and education explain most of the small tendency of women to go to less elite schools than men. His interpretation is that the field choices are driving the school choices, although the opposite causal direction is also possible. All this evidence of early gender differences in field aspirations suggests a role for gendered socialization. Yet early differences and socialization cannot be the whole story since, as Jacobs (1989) and Xie and Shauman (2003) point out, many young women who start out in predominantly male majors switch back to more traditional choices as college proceeds. Other social forces must push women back toward traditional fields.
2. Most discussions of devaluation do not explore how or why the devaluation of anything associated with women got inscribed in culture. One perspective on this is offered by feminist revisions of psychoanalytic theory, pioneered by Chodorow (1978) . In this view, the fact that women do primary parenting means that boys have a different-gender parent, so that the formation of gender identity helps boys to individuate from their mothers but also leads them to define being a boy or man as separation from and a rejection of women. This is one possible root of misogynistic cultural biases and men's need to dissociate themselves from activities associated with women (Williams 1989 (Williams , 1993 .
3. For dissent from this view, see Filer (1989) and Tam (1997) . 4. Because fields dominated by men lead to jobs that pay more, one could dispute their use of the term "horizontal" for segregation by field. The point is that students in all fields complete the same amount of education. 5. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this hypothesis. 6. A table listing all fields and how categories changed over time is available from the first author.
7. Data were also available for 2003, but the categorization scheme changed between 2002 and 2003. 8. Whether our results are seen as consistent or inconsistent with Charles's and Bradley's view depends on whether one takes the strong or weak view of their thesis. The strong view seems to be that the two kinds of change (women's representation in higher levels of education and field segregation) are unrelated (or even positively related) across time and space. We test and reject this for our case. The weak view of the thesis is that egalitarian change in women's representation in getting higher degrees advances faster than the egalitarian change of field desegregation. Our results are consistent with this.
9. Political science is another field that is disproportionately male throughout the period and shows a similar pattern of men's decline in the first half of the period (while women increased modestly). History also shows a decline in the proportion of men choosing the major until 1987 but a parallel decline for women.
10. If we consider all other education majors combined, there is a similar pattern of a dramatic decline in the proportion of women who chose the major in the first half of the period, much larger than the fall for men.
11. However, for fields of doctoral study, the deterrent effect of feminization on men's entry into the field was weaker in the 1990s than previously.
12. Some schools admit students by major (often in response to enrollment pressure). This is particularly true in professional schools that give baccalaureate degrees; for example, we know of engineering, communications, and business programs that do this. But this is not true with most majors, and with a high enough grade point average, one can often transfer to even these majors. 
